This article explores how Bolshevik/Soviet authorities took on and adapted the Russian imperial topography of power i.e. the system of special structures that intended to convey state ideology (monuments to tsars and statesmen, emperors' residences with their various ceremonial spaces, administrative buildings, and those museums which play a role in power representation). The research traces the changing attitudes to the Russian Empire's space of power in 1917 -late 1920s that varied from destructing such spatial objects to adapting them to the objectives of propaganda. It argues that with the time being appropriation strategies (renaming, recoding, creating of revolutionary memorials etc.) appeared to have better prospects than straightforward disavowal or destruction. The imperial space of power provided some opportunities to propagate novel and/or universal connotations of power and gradually was found relevant for the needs of the Soviet regime.
The period following the events of 1917 has traditionally been perceived as the time when the pre-revolutionary social and political institutes were dismantled, and the generations of nobility, who acted as the custodians of cultural memory, were swept away 3 . Apparently, this feeling of an utter collapse was primarily due to changes in ideology, to the rise of new agencies that had no counterpart before the revolution and to an aggressive invasion into the conservative sphere of everyday life. At the same time, a huge shift in the standards of everyday life often fails to explain the cultural deep currents where this shift could have been less significant, while the realities of pre-revolutionary life remained somehow relevant, despite the scope of the change. We believe that the development and use of the discourse of power in early 20 th century
Russia is one of such social and cultural phenomena.
An analysis of how contexts of power -such as the space of power -are formed can help us prove this statement true. We define the 'space of power' as a set of spatial objects and guidelines embodying certain ideas and attitudes, including monuments to tsars and statesmen, emperors' residences with their various ceremonial spaces, administrative buildings, and those museums which play a role in power representation. These objects had been emerging for several centuries, but in the end they all became part of a single representative space of the Russian empire. Within this space, power was positioned by means of various practices, including direct use of state insignia (the imperial coat of arms, as well as the arms of its constituent lands, imperial crowns, monograms, etc.), but also by often less explicit references to the symbolism of the four cardinal directions and specific gender and military connotations [Boltunova, 2015; Boltunova, 2014] .
Objects which proved important for implementing imperial discourse of power were once again in demand as soon as in the first decade after the revolution. This article is an attempt to trace the changing attitudes to the Russian Empire's space of power in 1917 -late 1920s, as well as to examine the prospects of borrowing and reproducing the discursive practices of power that originally existed in the representative space of pre-revolutionary Russia. This, in its turn, will help us assess the impact the latter had on the rise of early Soviet power project.
The perception of imperial space of power in late 1910s and early 1920s can thus be studied as linked to the symbolic constituent which always underpinned this space. On the one hand, this symbolism could be denied and the spatial objects then destroyed or used merely in the operational sense. On the other, an attitude could have been expressed by recoding the symbolism rather than denying it. The latter strategy allowed both admitting the symbolic capacity of an object and adapting it to the objectives of propaganda.
Between these two extreme paths ran the via media of turning an object into a museum.
An imperial palace becoming a museum sent a very clear social message: the palace was 3 The author expresses her gratitude to Vladimir Makarov for his assistance in translation of the article.
declared part of the past, albeit the recent past. Not only did it change its function, but, being turned into a site of memory, it no longer lived. At the same time, as shown below, such a practice left the door open for potential appropriation of wider contexts within a space previously used as an administrative and ceremonial one.
An active disavowal of the imperial discourse of power by means of a direct and aggressive assault against the objects associated with it was an explicit feature of the first postrevolutionary years. Monuments -primarily the monumental statues of Russian monarchsproved the most conspicuous victims. Only a handful of examples would suffice. In 1918, the Alexander II monument in Nizhny Novgorod was torn down [Sokol, 2006, 102] . In 1919, the same fate befell the two sculptures celebrating Peter the Great: "Peter Rescues the Drowning"
and "The Tsar Carpenter", which were then melted down [Sokol, 2006, 51] . In 1928, the Alexander I statue in Taganrog followed suit [Sokol, 2006, 79] . At the same time, a more abstract symbolism of monuments shaped as columns and obelisks (rather than statues) often helped them survive the first post-revolutionary years.
Notably, a specific situation in a region and the attitudes of regional powers were probably a more important factor than the implementation of Lenin's monumental propaganda plan. While Odessa lost its statue of Catherine the Great [Sokol, 2006, 64] , the Petrograd authorities spared it. The Nicholas I monument in Kiev was torn down three years after the revolution [Sokol, 2006, 83] , while its counterpart in the northern capital survived amidst calls for its demolition, which have been voiced since the February revolution [Sokol, 2006, 85] .
The new authorities found themselves in a more difficult situation vis-a-vis palaces.
While it had been possible to classify noblemen's mansions in accordance with their owner's attitudes -from 'progressive'/'pro-Revolution' to 'regressive'/'ancien regime', the palaces of the Romanovs proved a more difficult challenge. In this respect, a decree of 1918 is quite telling.
Signed by Lenin, it mandated the destruction of monuments to "tsars and their henchmen" (tsarei heaps, large and small pieces thrown together. Many pieces were broken and lost in the course" [Izmaylov, 2015, 316 ].
The events that followed left as strong an impression on palace administrators as the panic in February 1917. In the days of October revolution the personnel of Oranienbaum palaces discussed the rumors that the Grand Palace in Tsarskoye Selo had been burnt down [Benua, 2006, 151] . They also had to take measures to prevent looting [Benua, 2006, 168-169, 200-202] .
On top of that all, the German offensive against St. Petersburg in 1918 led a to forced evacuation of many pieces from the Winter Palace, the Hermitage and suburban palaces to Moscow.
Apparently, in many cases (including that of Peterhof) the evacuation created the same degree of chaos as the 'rescue' operation at the news of Nicholas II's abdication 4 . Items from the collections of imperial palaces stayed in Moscow for several years.
Due to all of these factors, by mid-1920s the recently museumified palaces had to begin a thorough reconstruction of their rooms and spaces on the basis of studying archival data, photos and pictures. In the Winter Palace, the trashed imperial suite of Nicholas II was restored in 1922 [Nesin, 1999, 7] . Reconstruction of the interiors of Peterhof palaces (Alexandria, the Lower and Potyomkin-Tavrichesky and V.M. Dolgorukov-Krymsky were removed in 1920, and the busts of Marx, Engels and Lenin appeared instead [Sokol, 2006, 66] . In the same year, the monument to Alexander II the Liberator was destroyed in Kazan and replaced with a plaster statue of a worker [Sokol, 2006, 95] . In 1925, the statue of the Liberator in Vladimir gave way to that of Lenin, and in 1928 a monument to the communist leader became a part of the grand monument of the 300 th anniversary of the Romanov dynasty in Kostroma [Sokol, 2006, 92, 173] . In all of these cases, the pedestal of the monument remained the same.
Elsewhere, a symbolic shift could be achieved by relocating the existing monument.
After the revolution, the Peter the Great monument in Petrozavodsk was moved from the main square to the small park in front of the city museum [Sokol, 2006, 45] . In Taganrog and Tula the statues of the founder of the empire were relocated to the local museums [Sokol, 2006, 453-454] .
deemed it impossible to completely erase the references to Russia's first emperor.
Sometimes, the recoding turned into outright mockery. A conspicuous case is the change of inscription on the pedestal of the Alexander III monument, erected shortly before the revolution at the Nikolaevsky Terminal in St. Petersburg. In 1919, the original inscription, "To the Royal Founder of the Great Siberian Railway" was destroyed and replaced with The Scarecrow, a poem by Demyan Bedny, which mocked the 'inglorious' emperor [Shaposhnikova, 1996] . However, these new burials in the territory directly adjacent to a palace (most frequently, in the square in front of the main entrance) had a number of specific features. We must begin by emphasizing the non-cemetery status of the burials, which is due to the exceptional nature of the practice endowed it with a new symbolism. These new symbols eroded the semantic boundaries of the palace complex as we knew it and became its new centers, wrestling this role away from the palaces proper. Moreover, the revolutionary burials became starting points for the discursive unfurling of the symbolism of the new regime. The memorials and monuments erected here, together with renaming the square itself, created a new space which appealed to emotion, thus making the territory fit for a series of the rites of belonging, celebrating the new idea (such as rallies, civic processions, military parades, public oaths, etc.)
As the canon of a revolutionary event was still unwritten in late 1910s and early 1920s, these public events in front of palaces could take various shapes. In 1920, the third anniversary of the revolution was celebrated with a reenactment of the storming of the Winter Palace. It is in the same context that we should place the game of chess played by I. Rabinovich and P. Hence, the attempts to fully eliminate the imperial context were doomed to failure. December 12, 1918 , the Sovnarkom adopted a resolution to "take steps to use the rooms of the Grand Kremlin Palace as museum, especially to present a historical view of the everyday life of the tsars" [Lenin, 1970a, 212, 418, 454] .
The Winter Palace is the most notable example of the attitudes to the imperial space of power. In 1920s it was turned into an experimental space which tested every possible approach, from destruction to appropriation. At the outbreak of the revolution it had an unusual status of the emperor's residence turned into a military hospital. 6 In the first years of the new regime the palace underwent a wave of destruction, with some of its interiors lost and a part of collections The place where the monarch sat was thus not left vacant. The cult of the monarch was succeeded by the cult of anti-imperialist struggle, which was evidently elevated to the status of a "holy war", since the weapons were displayed right under the preserved baldaquin. The German context was also far from accidental, promising struggle for the global revolution. On the whole, the experience of the late 1910s and early 1920s showed that for the secular objects which shaped the imperial discourse of power, appropriation had better prospects than straightforward disavowal or destruction. The imperial space of power provided some opportunities to propagate novel and/or universal connotations of power and gradually was found relevant for the needs of the Soviet regime.
It is also confirmed by the very choice for the seat of the government after it relocated to Moscow in 1918. Although they could have chosen any of the administrative buildings in the old 7 V. Nesin's suggestion that the Historic Chambers museum was closed due to a huge interest among the public might be not entirely unreasonable. The new authorities might have considered this unacceptable in the context of the upcoming 10th anniversary of the October revolution [Nesin, 1999, 7] .
capital, the Bolsheviks decided in favour of the Kremlin as the nucleus in the city's topography of power. Although their choice was largely motivated by security concerns, an important place in it belonged to the logic of urban cityscape, where the Kremlin acted as both the actual and the symbolic focal point of the city. 
